Committee: 9-Party
Topic: Crisis in the People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)
The UK, The US, France, Germany, Netherlands, Belgium, Japan, South Korea, Denmark
The UK briefs:
An alarming explosion at the DPRK North Korean Yongbyon Atomic Nuclear Complex was reported about eight hours before, which, like previous accidents, has been described as an accident at a gas line or hydroelectric plant by the DPRK. A week before the scheduled 31 March 9-party disarmament conference on the situation in the DPRK, an emergency dialogue is being held between the 9 parties, including the UK, on the news of the 24 March incident. The UK sees the DPRK regime as a serious threat to regional and global peace and security since it continues to test WMD one after another, regardless of international relations, treaties, and principles. Strictly speaking, the UK is committed to preventing any misconduct that poses threats to her allies, partners, and interests. Significantly, since 1968, the UK has been the signatory starting from the Nuclear Nonproliferation and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty to the Biological and Chemical Weapons Convention and so on (Arms Control Association, online). As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, and committed to maintaining international peace and security (UNA-UK, online), the UK aims at a comprehensive approach to conflict resolution (Kariuki, 2022, para. 6). The UK is strongly committed to full implementation of the NPT in all its aspects (GOV.UK, para. 4), fully supporting the work of the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in North Korea (GOV.UK). The UK was not only among the top 5 humanitarian donors worldwide in 2021 but also was one of the champions of international humanitarian law and humanitarian access in situations of conflict and crisis (Kariuki, 2022, para. 5).
North Korea is developing one WMD technology after another. In fact, Kim’s government has so far failed to honour any of the UN’s resolutions (Fifield, 2016). Pyongyang successfully launched a “Brilliant Star” satellite into space which proves Kim’s continued willingness to defy the international community. (2016). Recently, in October 2020, DPRK test-fired a new but smaller submarine-launched ballistic missile SLBM which is likely aimed to field operational missile submarines, diversify submarine launch options and more missiles per boat. (Shin, 2021, online). DPRK claimed in its 6th nuclear test in 2016 that it could contain a hydrogen or thermonuclear bomb that would further improve its nuclear weapons technology (Council on Foreign Relations, 2022, para. 6). Not only that, Kim Jong Un has launched a total of 23 missiles in 16 missile test programs as of February 2016 to perfect his weapons technology (Berlinger, 2017, section. 2), and claims that at least one of them is capable of carrying a nuclear warhead (Council on Foreign Relations, 2022, para. 6). Then, on 4 July, for the first time, he conducted an ICBM test, claiming that his ICBM was capable of reaching any part of the world (Berlinger, 2017, section. 5). Not only does DPRK’s ICBM pose threat to our soil, but it also continues to threaten direct attacks on all our allies and destabilizes global security. Its short-range SRBM could strike South Korea and Japan at any time; this means that no one will be spared from this regime’s deadly weapons if it is not stopped in time.
In our ongoing pressure process over the DPRK, this emergency meeting offers a way to force it to seat at the negotiation table to control its multilateral misconduct; including its previous regional security breaches and intercontinental missile tests. We need to find a way out of today’s emergency meeting on how to impose tough sanctions on the DPRK to protect the interests of the UK, her allies and her regional interests. In order to address the unrestrained deteriorating situation caused by the DPRK, the UK comes up with the following proposals:
With her allies, the UK makes it clear that the DPRK must comply with UN demands, and comprehensively and unalterably suspend its nuclear and ballistic missile programs (UNA-UK, online). The UK believes that a tough blockade can bring North Korea to the negotiating table (Pardo, 2020, online) avoiding the threat posed by lethal weapons, on the condition that it protects our interests, as we have seen in Somalia, Angola, Ivory Coast, Liberia and other African countries (GOV.UK, online). If the DPRK does not agree to come to the negotiating table, we can raise the issue of imposing tougher economic sanctions on this regime. The UK proposes that all the UN member countries must be ensured that they enforce the sanctions. The UN member countries need to keep up condemnations against all the DPRK’s tests for WMDs. Since Kim does not seem like the leader of the African countries, we propose economic sanctions as well as some more stressful activities. In addition, we recommend that an emergency relief aid program be put in place so that in the event of a humanitarian crisis, they can immediately put pressure on Kim Jong Un to move forward with humanitarian assistance. For the awakening of the people of DPRK, obsessed with Kim’s devotion, they can be made aware of the real situation and their uncertain future. So, the news of the developed West’s happiness and comfort must reach them. In this case, our espionage agents can enable information to the people of North Korea on how far behind their standard of living is. Western intelligence based in South Korea can operate as well for the same objective; for example, delivery of micro SD cards, “nose cards” (BBC, 2017, online) in the cities of North Korea through the borders. If we carry out such actions in addition to the severe economic blockade, Kim Jong Un is highly likely to agree to sit down for talks in a short time. We think the most important thing now is to be able to bring North Korea to the negotiating table. With reference to Seoul’s Foreign Minister then we hope to persuade him by using soft power. We would need to offer development, financial and humanitarian assistance to North Korea in exchange for the free access of international inspectors, including monitoring equipment, to sensitive research complexes, including Yongbyon. We should aim to convince North Korean delegates in such a way that they will be assured. Regardless of the national initiative or interest of the DPRK, the signing of the NPT in 1968 demonstrates that international sentiment is against the narrow national right to protect humankind from the spread of WMD (Starkey, Boyer, Wilkenfeld, 1010, p.78). After all, what the UK believes is that it is time to bring a rogue state like DPRK to the negotiation table by convincing it that being isolated in the 21st century must be ended, and needs to embrace a global world of friendship with peacebuilding.
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