The Arab-Israeli War of 1973 was the fourth war between the Arab States and Israel. When the Arabs call it the October War or Ramadan War[1], the Israelis call it the Yom Kippur War.[2] At 14:00 hours on 6 October 1967, Egypt and Syria attacked Israel respectively in Sinai and Golan. There are complaints that the Israeli Intelligence community failed to assess an imminent attack by the Arabs which was at the doorway. However, the then U.S. Secretary of State Dr. Henry Kissinger commented on Israel’s Yom Kippur debacle that there was no lack of intelligence; it was the interpretation of the reports that was faulty.[3] Israel set up electronic eavesdropping and early warning stations in the Jordan Valley along the border with Jordan, and on Mount Hermon in the Golan Heights.[4] By 1969, the Israeli Air Force (IAF) was using drones to photograph and monitor Egyptian, Syrian, and soon after Jordanian troops.[5] However, despite the claims that Israel did not lack any intelligence collection,[6] still, to some extent, Israel did have some deficiency in intelligence gathering. On the other hand, the failure to warn against the surprise attack the intelligence analysis wing is to blame more than the collection faction in Israeli defense. The analysts could not decipher the Egyptian deceptions. Just before the assault on the morning of 6 October, there was the deployment of special Egyptian squads along the canal without helmets, weapons, or shirts and they swam, spent time with fishing lines, and ate oranges.[7] Moreover, other previous deceptions also fooled the Israeli analysts. On 4 October, the Egyptian media reported that 20,000 reservists were ‘demobilized’.[8] During that time it was also exposed that due to Ramadan, officers were allowed to go on for the pilgrimage.[9]
At the juncture of the crucial question of a state’s existence, the analysts should be able to estimate the actual warning to level on the necessary cables. Though to some extent, Israel lacked needed defectors, and enough double agents in the enemies’ workplaces, still it should be said that she had reasonable intelligence information in order to analyze, and warn. However, the analysis did not take place necessarily, and during the war, her analysts were not made aware of the abilities of the newly engaged Soviet types of equipment. Moreover, her analysts could not estimate that Iraqi Air and Ground Forces reinforcements would take place very quickly.[10] Similarly, her analysts could not assess that North Korean pilots would work for the Egyptian Air Force.[11] In the intelligence analysis game, the Arabian party won and their adversary was defeated therefore, Israel had to sacrifice a lot of losses in the initial stage of the war, and at some point in the initial stage her existence was shaken. And accordingly, Israel had to consider using her nuclear weapons as her last resort.[12]
A national inquiry commission ‘Agranat Commission’ was established in November 1973, to investigate the function of the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) in the Yom Kippur War.[13] The Commission members were asked to examine the intelligence available from before the war on the intentions of Syria and Egypt, the analysis of the intelligence by the authorized civilian and military units, the general preparedness of the IDF to fight, especially on the date of 5 October 1973, and the day prior to the outbreak of the war.[14] After the inquiry, the recommendations of the commission were significant in terms of changing the structure of the Israeli intelligence and security establishment. The Commission’s recommendations included the creation of a Cabinet Committee for Defense, the division of intelligence analysis to several authorized units, the appointment of an advisor for intelligence matters to the Prime Minister, and a clear division of labor, authority, and responsibility between the Government, the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defense and the IDF Chief of Staff.[15] In the criticism of Aman, the Agranat Commission concluded that Aman failed to provide an early warning as required by decision-makers that the war was going to start.[16]
The view of the Israeli Intelligence:
After ascending to power Anwar Sadat tried to acquire an advanced weapon system from the USSR. But he failed.[17] This initial failure made the Israeli Intelligence establishment realize that the Arab nations were left incapacitated.[18]
There were problems with the analysis and assessment by the Israeli intelligence community. The two most fatal embedded notions that the Israeli defense and security officials fostered are that Egyptians would not go to war until they achieved the capability to run the Soviet war types of equipment and in the case of Syria, it was held that she would not risk a war alone.[19] Another notion that it failed to assess is the strength of Egypt, Syria, and other Arab states that they gained after the ‘shameful’ defeat in 1967. Therefore, based on the enemies’ development, Israel did not look to employ reserves in addition to her standing armies.[20]
Prior to Yom Kippur, from the tremendous six-day war victory over the Arabs in 1967, the Israelis had the pride that their forces, especially the ISF were unconquerable. There was marvelously advantageous striking power of the ISF over the Arab Ground and Air Forces in 1967. Therefore, when the Egyptian and Syrian Forces were heavily deploying their respective number of troops near the Israeli borders, the hubris of the Israeli Security People hindered much from going for any deterring measures over any forthcoming Arab attacks. Moreover, right before the October War, on 13 September, the IAF came into a fight with the Syrian Air Force over a reconnaissance mission over Syrian territory and shot down 12 Syrian aircraft, but she just suffered one loss.[21] This naturally reinforced her military’s credence again that the Arabs would not attack on account of Israel’s once-again proven air capability.[22] In fact, the Israeli Intelligence did not properly and consistently analyze the strengthening of the Arab forces which was helped by the then superpower USSR. She also did not adequately analyze the question of why or for what purpose the Arab States were developing their military power. Was it defensive or for offensive purposes? The Israeli Intelligence community assumed it for defensive purposes.[23] And they were wrong in their estimate because if it was so, then, the Arabs did not need to come to the border areas. They would do that in the other important strategic points in their interiors. At the beginning of the war, the Israeli forces were losing because of their underestimated assessment of Arabs’ development in military power. Aman crucially underestimated the lethal effectiveness of the Soviet-made Sagger anti-tank missiles (which the Egyptian infantry used in order to have a devastating effect against Israeli armor) and the SAM batteries (which both the Egyptians and Syrians used with overwhelming effect against the IAF).[24] Furthermore, no evidence is found from any declassified Israeli archive that Israeli intelligence establishments were able to obtain the wire of the crucial details of the June meeting between Assad and Sadat. In June, the two leaders decided to mount an attack within several months and the date chosen was 6 October 1973.[25]
The root of the problem:
There were domestic concerns for Hafez al Asad and Anwar Sadat that a war was necessary. The defeat in the Six-Day War in 1967 was a national shame for the Arabs. To recover from the shame, the Arab leaders needed to get back the lost territories. President Assad viewed that negotiations could take place only after getting back the Golan Heights by force which could make Israel quit the West Bank and Gaza and induce other compromises. Sadat was also worried about the economic depression of Egypt. A war was necessary for his popularity in that circumstance. Even, Sadat hoped that by inflicting even a limited defeat on the Israelis, the status quo could be altered.[26] Personally, Sadat also felt that before any reform could be introduced, shame had to be overcome.[27] Here, the Israeli intelligence failed to analyze the personal attitude of Sadat. Aryeh Shalev, the then director of the Israeli Defense Force’s Intelligence Research Department, also found this fact as an error of the Israeli’s pre-war assessment.[28] In the Biography of Sadat, Raphael Israel also argued that the root of the problem was in the great shame over the Six-Day War that Sadat was feeling.[29]
The other complementary issues:
Egypt had the undeclared objectives to convince the Soviet leaders that there were deficiencies in most of the aircraft, and air defense weaponry they had supplied to Egypt against the advanced weaponry that the US had supplied to Israel.[30] How well the Israeli intelligence assessed this Egyptian effort is important.
On the other hand, the leak of the Egyptian crossing of the Suez Canal is important to be discussed in the sense of whether the Israeli Intelligence properly evaluated it. The USSR did not want to confront the US in relation to Arab Israel conflagration after 1967.[31] Egypt saw that the USSR met with the US at OSLO to maintain the status quo[32]and probably believed that the leak took place over there by the USSR. In fact, the then Soviet leader on Foreign Affairs Brezhnev warned the USA about an explosive Arabian situation for a war in June 1973.[33] Also, it is very important to see how seriously the Intelligence took the matter of expelling the Soviet officers from Egypt. In order to preserve the elements of surprise Sadat expelled almost 20,000 Soviet military officers from Egypt.[34] It was a fact. It fooled the further intelligence on Arab’s impending attack. On the other hand, it might have double effects on Israeli Intelligence Analysis. The Analysts might have taken it as Egypt was not ready for a war. Again, the analysts might just take it as a diplomatic action taken by Sadat out of anguish on no more access to the Soviet Military pieces of equipment.
There was more open-source information. The Russian civilians and their families were evacuated from Egypt just before the war.[35] There might be no conclusion as to what way the Israeli intelligence analyzed the information. However, the evacuation of the foreign civilians and the families of the foreign workers is a very symptom of a very forthcoming war, and it happened in many places in the history of the world.
Interconnections between the factors of the rivalries can be a great tool to make a proper intelligence analysis. Sadat called the Russian ambassador Vinogradov on 3 October and gave the impression of a plan for a massive breach of the ceasefire.[36] In turn, on the next day, there was Brezhnev’s request to be able to withdraw the Russian civilians.[37] Instead of betraying Arabs, and the other way, in favor of Détente, it was the best that the USSR could do and did. Unfortunately, Tel Aviv’s intelligence failed to assess the interconnected events. Firstly, the Soviet high command people like Brezhnev warned the US about the Arab motion. Secondly, there was unusual development of the Arab military beside the Israeli borders. Thirdly, there was a deceptive expulsion of Soviet military experts. Fourthly, there was the departure of the Soviet civilians from Egypt. There were many more incidents qualified to be taken into account. However, none of the occurrences were connected with each other properly by the Israeli analysts.
After 1967: After 1967, Arab leaders made ongoing deceptive performances. On Radio Cairo, Egyptian President Sadat, and King Hussein of Jordan discussed the preparations for the fateful battle against Israel.[38] Sadat also threatened war with Israel in an interview published in Newsweek.[39] In the Israeli intelligence community, it was not important to highlight because the Israelis found it as a tactical element to pressure Israel to withdraw from Sinai. But Israel might not want to sacrifice the occupied Sinai. Moreover, it was a repetition of previous threats that Sadat had been making many times.[40]
Benefit from the false threat, disinformation:
The benefit of producing false threats that Egypt got is that the Israelis took the false threats as nothing but pressure to sacrifice the occupied territory. Several times during 1973, the Arab forces conducted large-scale exercises that put the Israeli army and the IDF on the highest level of alert. The Israeli leadership already believed that if an attack took place, the IAF would be able to repel it easily.[41] However, this assessment of repelling did not become easy in reality as many jet fighters from Iraq, Libya, and Algeria joined with the Egyptian Combat Air Crafts.[42] Moreover, Israel had no counter arrangement to fight the Syrian MBTS which had night vision equipment.[43] Furthermore, no Israeli Archive has yet disclosed that Israel could obtain intelligence prior to the Syrian mission of commandos who were dropped by helicopter and took the most important Israeli stronghold at Jabal al-Shaikh (Mount Hermon).[44]
The expulsion of the Soviet military experts was not analyzed with multiple significations. Both Israel and the US estimated only that it would further reduce Egypt’s warfare capability.[45] But such action had other significations i.e. its apparent surface meaning could be seen as a vindicating act of Egypt since the USSR did not provide the demanded military aid. But the secondary significations were that it tried to stop further leak of its warfare plan of Yom Kippur[46] and create a misconception that if a surprise attack would take place then Israel would easily be able to counter Egypt without the USSR. The Egyptians made repeated misleading reports that there was a continual stream of false information on maintenance problems and a lack of personnel to operate the most advanced Soviet equipment.[47] Moreover, Sadat’s tactic of false warning came into effect. He was giving threats in 1971 by calling it “the year of decision”, and in the next years, he repeatedly showed aggressive intentions.[48] By September and October of 1973, when Egypt was really preparing for war Israeli analysts believed that she was not looking for waging war indeed because there had been false alarms in the past.[49] Therefore, Sadat’s tactic succeeded. False alarms worked eventually when the countering forces realized this was usually worthless.
The Israeli Intelligence ‘knew’ that the Arabs were ‘preparing for the war’. It was evident by the joint military exercises near Israeli border areas. Moreover, Sadat was looking for diplomatic support from country to country. By the fall of 1973, Sadat had satisfactory responses from most of the countries of the Arab League, Non-Aligned Movement, and Organization of African Unity.[50] Moreover, it was also evident that in 1972, Sadat publicly stated that Egypt was committed to going to war with Israel and that they were prepared to “sacrifice one million Egyptian soldiers”.[51]
Lead to attack, Israeli Intelligence and Ministers:
Aman, the IDF’s Directorate of Military Intelligence Research Department, was responsible for assessing Israeli intelligence.[52] One of the major intelligence failures of Israel that has been so outspoken is the failure to estimate the massive deployment of the Egyptian and the Syrian Troops at their then-respective borders as preparation for the war. Military Intelligence (MI) analysts dismissed this deployment as defensive against Israeli air strikes.[53] Aman dismissed warning of Arab attack even after receiving foreign intelligence reports indicating a buildup of forces near Israeli borders.[54]
Leading to Yom Kippur the military exercises by Egypt and Syria near the Israeli Borders are important in discussing the intelligence failure of Aman. The intelligence assessment of Aman took the Egyptian exercise as mere training.[55] The Syrian exercise was a puzzle though, but still, Aman did not take it as a threat to imminent war because it found Syria would not go to war without Egypt and Egypt was not ready for war until she received the weaponry she wanted.[56] Whenever Egyptian built-ups were continually viewed as a practice exercise then Syrian deployments were more severe.[57] Aman failed to analyze the motive of Syrian reinforcements to the Golan after the battle of 13 September.[58] All of these developments were dangerous. Even, after receiving a ‘US assessment suggesting the probability of an attack’ was even neglected by Israel.[59] It means that to the Israelis, there was no reality of a large-scale attack until it really came true.
When King Hussein of Jordan secretly flew to Tel Aviv and warned the then Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir about an impending attack, then, it was not made into a serious alert, as to Aman, the information provided by Hussei, was not enough. Aman claimed what Hussein said was not actually what he already knew.[60] The point is that if a party from the opponent world needs to tell everything then what is the job or role of Aman as an intelligence organization?
Not only this but also there was a problem with consensus correspondence in the line between the top intelligence managers and the policy makers. Contrary to the then Aman Chief Zeira’s assessment, the Mossad chief Zamir had his concern over the Syrian built-up and therefore, he went to alert Meir. Here, based on the assumption, and rising concern of him, there could be a meeting at the supreme level instead of running from one person to another. But, such event did not take place. In fact, Meir asked him to contact Defense Minister Dayan who had the same reassuring idea as Aman people that there was no likely danger.[61] The lack of a combined estimate on fully probable war worsened. On October 5, 1973, at 2:30 a.m., Zamir received a cable from an ‘irrefutably miraculous source’ expressing that a war was imminent.[62] Zamir digested the shattering significance of the cable. Nevertheless, there was no joint meeting of the Israeli high command. On the other hand, after informing Zeira about the content, and certainty of the message, Zamir went to meet the source himself in Europe,[63]which was time consuming and produced more communication gap. As no joint assessment took place at the highest level, therefore, after being confirmed about the attack during the time of Yom Kippur by Zamir in Europe, the time of the impending attack was wrongly calculated as 6 PM of 6 October.[64]
Moreover, when Meir, Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, and the Chief of Staff Elazar met at 8:05 a.m., the morning of Yom Kippur, six hours before the war, at that time, both Zeira and Zamir failed to qualify to join the meeting. Since Zvi Zamir had the breaking news from Marwan (at midnight on October 5/6th) he should have enabled himself to join the meeting and presented the intelligence.[65]
On the other hand, for the battlefield, the IAF had no effective countermeasure against the heavily fortified Egyptian and Syrian missile walls with SAM batteries. There is no evidence or report from Israeli Archive to show that Aman had updated intelligence in this context. The new SAM batteries caused the down of IAF35 aircraft by Syrian forces on 7 October.[66] And it is an intelligence failure because Aman failed to provide the power of the enemies’ missile walls.[67] Moreover, the intelligence failure of SAM batteries not only protected the Egyptian side by the Suez Canal but also the SAM batteries made the IAF less effective when it tried to bomb the Egyptian Crossings.
A junior military intelligence officer had the uncovering of truth. He uncovered the huge Egyptian deployments and exercises along the Suez Canal as camouflage for a real canal-crossing assault.[68] Unfortunately, such espionage information has problems with processing at the higher level of assessment.[69] Otherwise, it could be possible for the analysts to assess even the exact date of the attack. Because on the 6 October evening, the moon would shine from sunset to midnight, and thereafter, would be giving total darkness to allow the Egyptians to hide their canal-crossing bridges.[70] Moreover, October 6 had a minimal difference between high and low tide which was favorable for the bridge building.[71]
Failure of Israeli Intelligence during the war:
Israeli Air support in the Golan was not very effective because of the lack of intelligence in certain fields. In subsequent days, the IAF expended its energies by bombing Egyptian pontoon bridges on the canal.[72] Those were easily replaced each time. But, Israeli Air Command failed to notice such re-installment. Because of no intelligence, the IAF could not attempt a full-scale attack on the SAM3 and SAM6.[73] Updated intelligence was very necessary to locate the establishment of SAM6 missiles and neutralize such anti-aircraft batteries. As a result, the Air Force had to sacrifice its image of air superiority, and a myth was born that the SAM6 system was invincible.[74]
Israeli Intelligence success during the war:
Despite many failures, Israeli intelligence also had several successes. Aman was able to detect a gap between the Egyptian Second Army which was crossing the Suez Canal near Ismailia, and the Third Army which was moving toward the south; between the Suez and Great Bitter Lake.[75] It was the most vulnerable point of the Egyptian forces. Therefore, the IDF forces broke through it to reach the Suez Canal at Dier Suweir on 15 October and crossed onto the west bank of the canal.[76] There was also the success of the SIGINT of Aman. It tracked down the move of the 25th Egyptian Brigade toward the north leaving the Third Army alone. Upon hearing this information, Major General Ariel Sharon was able to send countering forces after the 25th Brigade and was able to destroy the brigade completely with a few casualties of their own.[77]
On the other hand, on the Eastern Front, there was Israeli intelligence success as well. Syrian armor happened to shatter through shallow Israeli tank defenses in the occupied Golan Heights.[78] Blums information is repeated in the article of Zionism-Israel Web Log as that on the morning of 7 October, Israel intercepted a radio message sent from the 132 Syrian Armored Brigade. The message was ‘I see the whole Galilee in front of me, Request permission to proceed.’ The intelligence was evaluated, and the gravity of the situation was eventually understood.[79] As a result of the successful analysis, the planned IAF assault in Sinai was halted, and its fighter jets were turned around to strike the Syrians.[80]
IAF Analysis:
Unlike other intelligence branches, the IAF should have been less blamed. Gordon’s report is repeated in the Zionism-Israel Web Log which says that IAF had sufficient warning of the outbreak of the war. Air Force commander Benny Peled had advance warning of the war.[81]
The ‘Concept’, Egyptian Policy and Intelligence Success:
Prior to the October War, an embedded pride took place in Israeli Intelligence and Defence communities. In June 1972, Major General Aharon Yariv, the then head of Aman, submitted a document entitled ‘Annual Intelligence Evaluation,’ to the then Chief of Operations, Major General Yisrael Tal. The document claimed Aman could be expected to provide warning to the General Staff of an Egyptian attack, 36 hours in advance. It also claimed that Aman could give the same warning with a lower likelihood of a Syrian attack.[82]
There was an embedded concept of pride that shaped the Israeli Intelligence Analysis. The concept was basically the fact that Arabs would not attack Israel in the near future because they did not achieve the required capacity to destroy the target sectors of their enemy. There were some military features upon which the concept was constituted. For example, Israelis figured out that unless the Egyptians acquired long-range Sukhoi bombers and Scud missiles in order to paralyze IAF, there was nothing to be worried about.[83] Weak Israeli evaluation strengthened the misconception about the surprise. In March 1973, the Israeli Intelligence community received signs indicating that Egypt was conducting a major military mobilization and exercises.[84] On an evaluation following that situation, Zeira concluded that Egypt’s military command assessed that its forces were inferior to those of Israel, and Egypt would not be able to derive positive results from a war.[85] The Egyptian source ‘Marwan’ was liable to bolster Israeli faith in the concept. The source was a top-level person from an Egyptian aristocratic locale and possibly worked as a double agent.[86] It is likely that the ‘Egyptian agent’ made the Tel Aviv Intelligence believe what the Egyptian authority wanted the Israelis to believe. In the case of Syria, Israel figured out that Syria would not wage a war without Egypt.[87] Since Egypt was not ready for a war in the near future, therefore, the concept stood that no war would come from the Arab side. The concept was okay until October 1972.[88] But thereafter Sadat changed his mind and decided to go for a campaign without Scud Missiles and long-range Sukhoi bombers. But unfortunately, the concept remained seated by the Israelis until the war broke out.[89] According to Jervis and Lebow, the concept can be changed either when one gets new unequivocal information that runs counter to one’s perception or when a changed reality hits one in the face.[90] However, despite the information of several new incidents, the concept of Israeli intelligence did not change because it was awfully embedded. On the other hand, the concept proved right against the open threats of Sadat over the past years that he was looking for but in fact, was not producing any. The concept became loose when Elazar viewed it similarly to Jervis and Lobow. When Zeira concluded the probability of war was low, Elazar sensed that the ‘likelihood’ was a dynamic concept and was conditional upon specific developments.[91] He might estimate that due to situations like political stalemate and Egyptian disappointment with the US, there could be a short war, and therefore, he maneuvered a costly mobilization resulting in no countering of an Egyptian offense.[92] Subsequently, the concept regained its position in the mind of the Israeli authority. After all, the concept was boosted by the amazing victory of the Six Days War of 1967. Two months before Yom Kippur, Dayan stated that there was a large gap between the quality of the Arabs, and the Israelis, and in the IDF, and Aman. This prideful statement was supported since a study on the Egyptian POWs showed that the Israeli soldiers were more intelligent and superior.[93] And, when the USSR military experts left Egypt massively, the Israelis’ superiority complex became more embedded and dimmed the probability of an Egyptian assault.
Similar kind of evidence of over-confidence is found in the response to the questions made by Meir, Zeira responded to her that they would know the Egyptian crossing of Suez in advance and they would be able to give warning to her several days ahead.[94] Zeira responded that the means used to derive such warning would be the Egyptian preparation and he emphasized that an Egyptian preparation could not be hidden.[95] On another occasion, Zeira went further in showing competent warning processability. At a conference of IDF corps commander in the spring of 1973, he expressed that planning should not be ruled out a situation of no warning and undertaking of appropriate planning measures was necessary.[96]
In theoretical work on analytic performance, and strategic warning Jack Davis viewed that in order to improve the intelligence product there must be counter-effort to explore alternative plausible meanings of gaps in diagnostic information caused by adversarial denial and deception efforts.[97] Unfortunately, Tel Aviv’s intelligence analysts did not analyze the gaps in the diagnostic information. There is no declassified information to claim that its analysis was sufficient to include the questions of deception efforts made by Egyptians. If they would, they could find the gaps between what had been said by the ‘top Egyptian source Ashraf Marwan’[98] and what had been going on the other side of the Suez Canal in the name of exercise. Blinded by the success of the Six-Day War, the Israeli civilian leadership and military intelligence were unable to seriously treat the possibility of an Arab attack.[99]
Egyptians successfully applied strategic deception models and processes.[100] It is noteworthy that since the Sinai Campaign (1956), or perhaps, even earlier, Israel’s early warning system incorporating intelligence and operational components was in effect based on assessments or knowledge of the enemy’s intentions and decisions rather than their capabilities, readiness and preparedness. Therefore, it could be the reason why instead of operational deception, the Egyptians emphasized strategic deception.
Egyptians were successful in deception and false warnings. And perhaps, Marwan was very effective in strengthening the ‘concept’ of the Israeli intelligence and security communities. Even at the end, Major General Zamir, the chief of Mossad needed to go to Europe to meet him to be absolutely sure of what he said previously. Obviously what he provided over the phone did lack something for which Zamir did not have satisfaction in the query of his inner mind. Therefore, Zamir needed to leave for Europe which produced a communication gap at the most crucial time of Israel. In Europe, almost certainly, due to the deceptive influence of Marwan, the time of the impending attack was fixed as 1800 hours which was four hours later than the actual surprise time. After all, by the time Marwan provided the information of the impending Egyptian attack, it was too late to counter the massive preparations of the enemies on two fronts.[101]
Due to the success in deception and concealment, Egyptians could prevent an Israeli preemptive attack prior to the surprise or canal crossing. Otherwise, an initial Israeli strike could paralyze both Egyptian and Syrian military preparations and defensive positions. Moreover, Israel could deploy her reserves and additional deployments in the canal regions, and Golan Heights. After the defeat of 1967, it was essential to surprise the Israelis over any Egyptian decision to go to war and the prospective date of any such war.[102] The Egyptians took the concept that a pre-emptive offensive mission at the quickest time in the Sinai’s strategic places would make the surprise effective because it would delay the IDF defensive deployment and prevent Israeli pre-emptive counterattack (which had the subsequent tactic to transfer the battlefield to the enemy territory at the earliest possible time).[103]
In order to conceal the truth the Egyptians showed their military development on the canal side as ‘exercise’.[104] It was a cover story and the story stated that all the vast military preparations and activities were just parts of a large-scale all-arms exercise, named Tahrir.[105] Therefore, there would be a greater likelihood of understanding of the tale’s veracity by the Israeli intelligence sources and would then pass it to their decision makers.[106]
In the military field, Egyptians employed a lot of deception techniques which they acquired from the Soviets.[107] They created smoke on the bank of the Suez Canal so the crossings would be camouflaged. Egyptians also brought water canons in order to destroy the high berms on the Eastern embankment made by the Israeli force.[108] There is no evidence released yet from any Israeli Intelligence organizations or Agranat Commission that Israel was able to uncover the presence of such water canon.
Just before the assault on the morning of 6 October, there was the deployment of special Egyptian squads along the canal bank without helmets, weapons, or shirts and they swam, spent time with fishing lines, and ate oranges.[109] While making the large-scale joint staff exercise and mobilization in the name of Tahrir and while additional reserves joined the exercise the Egyptians were subsequently broadcasting a cover story on ‘Exercise’[110] in order to bolster their strategic deception paradigm.
Egyptian planners did know that the early warning system of the Israeli forces is the cornerstone of national security doctrine which is very effective in having military success over the enemy.[111] Therefore, they needed to take initiatives to repel the exploitation of the doctrine. Therefore, Egyptians needed to disinform the Israelis and in order to do so they employed the double agent ‘Marwan’ very skillfully.
The Egyptians conducted research on the contemporary Israeli mindset.[112] The Egyptian planners also made research on possible cognitive bias. According to Sheffy, there are two kinds of biases in order to make happen strategic surprise. One type is loss aversion which prefers continuation of the prevailing situation irrespective of actual events. Another type is the status quo bias.[113] On the intelligence level, these biases are likely to steer toward the interpretation of information and signals indicating undesirable changes on the enemy side as unreliable.[114] And on the operational level, these may cause the defender to hesitate and delay providing the required response.[115] Therefore, it was seen that irrespective of the actual development (undesirable to the Israelis) of Egyptian strength at the canal areas the Israelis took it as an unreliable link to see the continuation of their own prevailing few forces at the Lev line areas and kept few soldiers at their erected forts. On the other hand, in order to show ‘business as usual’, the Egyptian leaders directed their half-naked soldiers to fish leisurely along the Suez Canal.[116] And as Yom Kippur came to prevail the authority allowed the reserves to go for holidays. For April and May 1973, Elazar mobilized forces. But as nothing happened and as the mobilization was costly,[117] therefore, the operational level bias took place. The hesitated leadership decided to take the mobilization back. Thereafter, on the morning of Yom Kippur, the government refused Elazar’s request for full mobilization. Only a partial mobilization of 50,000 reservists was authorized.[118] Therefore, according to the above theory, the defenders hesitated (in mobilization and demobilization a few months before Yom Kippur) and delayed (as partial mobilization was granted on Yom Kippur morning and therefore full mobilization was delayed) in response to Egyptian surprises.
There was fundamental deception to lasted at least for several months where the policy would pretend that it was in fact looking for a peaceful solution through diplomatic efforts.[119] After that there was situational deception aimed at dissolving any Israeli suspicion aroused due to any deviation between what was presented by the fundamental deception and any suspicious military development in reality.[120]
Certainly, there was deception coherence because of the Egyptians’ integration of misleading, concealment, and disinformation activities.[121] These activities were performed over visual, physical, communications, and verbal mechanisms in order to take advantage of any leaks.[122] Therefore, repelling any leaks would mean that the Israelis would not have any details on the Egyptian activities. And the more a country lacks precise detailed and concrete information on the success of foreign efforts in breaching its own security the more difficult it becomes for her to completely neutralize the specific cracks.[123] It was a well-known fact (and still it is) that the Egyptian intelligence and security forces were not competent as as Mossad and Aman. Therefore, instead of wasting efforts to seal Israeli collection channels the Egyptians went to firmly maintain their deception coherence.[124] Therefore, even when the most senior source King Hussein gave a strategic warning to Golda Meir,[125] it was not taken seriously. Again, though Meir and Dyan were serious about Hussein’s Warning[126] due to the embedded ‘concept’ such warning became loose to the Israeli intelligence and security communities.
It was Israel whose intelligence and political leadership failed to make decisions upon the so-far-produced intelligence. Elazar was wrong for calling up reserves in May upon the then intelligence indication of a probable Egyptian attack.[127] The early warning doctrine that the Israeli Intelligence adopted proved ineffective.[128] And this policy was wrong. Zeira’s responses to the questions of Meir on Egyptian Crossing were based on early warning policy. But though the early warning system was firmly adopted by the Israeli Security Authority in fact it failed in the context. According to Kahana excessive reliance on early warning with respect to intentions early warning is little more than gambling to resist surprise.[129] And by making repeated false warnings the Egyptians usefully paralyzed early warning as the then unnecessary mobilization became highly costly and also made the mindset of the Israeli authority exhausted on successive counter efforts. The Egyptians’ superior policy of strategic deception became successful with all their efforts of firmly maintaining the deception coherence.
About the Author – Syed Tanvir Yousuf is an MA in Security and Intelligence Studies. Presently, he is the CSPO at Dhaka Eye. Previously he was a Civil Servant in the UK; He also worked at CHC, Global Affairs Canada.
Citation details may be provided to the research workers, and case study students upon request to the author (pls email to indhaka@gmail.com or contact on 01730234893 / 01972224027 with text message).
