Abstract
Cold war was one of the nerve-racking chapters in the history of the world where the US and the Soviet Union as superpowers set themselves in an indirect battle with nuclear arms race, proxy war and ideological dominations. Among all the features of the Cold War, the most grim picture that the people of the world experienced was the arms race. A lot of political, historic, situational change, military, strategic and security reasons were behind the nuclear arms race. However, this paper would make effort to explain the nuclear arms race by the prisoner’s dilemma model of game theory, and would see the cold war development to the end.
Cold War Nuclear Arms Race
The United States and the USSR competed in nuclear weapons during the Cold War to gain strategic superiority over each other. It is significant to explain the race by prisoner’s dilemma that kept the world tense with the potential nuclear war in that period of time. In game theory, the prisoner’s dilemma is a situational model where one party cannot be sure what action the other party is going to take when both parties are concerned for their own security interests. In this case, they have four options. From a mutual naive point of view, it can be presumed that none of the parties would do anything. However, in this option, there is a risk that if one party remains silent, there is no guarantee that the other party will not do anything. Again, left behind in such a puzzle, neither side can become sure whether the opponent is going to expose their actions or not in some time. Thinking so, one party steps up in its own interest thinking that the other party would not step up. It can be vice-versa i.e. the scenario can be the opposite. But, it does not happen in real perspective i.e. both players act in reality. So in the end, both players decide individually, and clandestinely that it would be best to act selfishly, i.e. both steps up in their best interests. This situation was in the air during the Cold War i.e. each state went for the nuclear arms race on its own with the delusion to be in an advantageous military position over the other, expelling military superiority of the other side, and advancing in dominating the world. This paper would see how did the fighting powers think about acquiring the balance of power in the world towards the end of WWII? How did the idea of having nuclearisation emerge? whether the prisoner’s dilemma the only independent cause for the nuclear arms race during the cold war? Finding other reasons and reviewing them is also important. It’s needed to discuss how the strategic things developed. This paper would examine the scopes to explain the nuclear arms race by prisoner’s dilemma in the Cold War and why arming became the best strategy for both the US and the USSR.
Before making a nuclear weapon, a party needs to have a security assessment to see if it has a security defence to protect itself from any enemy attack because the other player would never want the rival to be nuclearized. But Stalin did not prevent the US nuclearisation because until the atom bombs destroyed Japanese cities, he did not know the power of the bomb despite intelligence from Fuchs[1] and hearing from Truman at Potsdam. Similarly, Truman did not go for preventing Soviet nuclear facilities because the US prediction was far behind what actually the Soviets were on the fission program.[2] All the nuclear powers work hard to conceal or deny their independent nuclear weapons capabilities to others.[3] Moreover, the power of the potential proliferator makes preventive war more costly.[4] The USSR could make the Soviet nuclear facilities undetected that a preventive strike on the Soviet military facilities in the huge Soviet landmass would relatively be costly. Therefore, the lack of enough intelligence and costs caused neither USSR nor the US to prevent each other’s initial nuclearisation. Moreover, in order to have nuclear power, neither the US nor the USSR had to rely on a powerful ally for the security guarantee or on any of their ally’s own security goals.[5] Being superpowers, both the power advanced themselves on their own security goals.
The nuclear arms race between the two superpowers does not only involve the quantity of nuclear weapon but also the strategic installation of the nuclear weapon, and the quality or destructive power of the readied nuclear weapon with fastest strike capability. Suppose, if a major war takes place, the party who would have arms with above nature would be under enormous temptation to use it before the opponent makes it.[6] Being in advantageous position, the objective would be to destroy the enemy as quickly as possible that it cannot survive a nuclear strike and lose its ability to strike back. Therefore, after the Arab attack in Yom Kippur the US being moved to DEFCON-3 alert, readied B-52 nuclear bombers before the USSR could strike at Israel since Golda Meir authorized activation and distribution of Nuclear Warheads.[7] In 1983, the Soviets, not being in prisoner’s dilemma but being strategically convinced that large scale military exercise named Able Archer 83 conducted strategically in Eastern Europe as ruse of the US nuclear strike, they armed their intercontinental nuclear missiles, and put those on the front line.[8] On the other hand, the US at various times believed not in terms of prisoner’s dilemma but for practical reasons that she possessed technological and economic advantages that allowed her to pursue sophisticated nuclear weapons[9] for her dominance as a superpower in the world. On the other hand, to have an empire for himself and his nation,[10] Stalin wanted to overtake the US advance in building the nuclear arms arsenal. Certainly, the more nuclear weapons would boost a state’s ability to achieve its security goals, the greater is the state’s willingness to nuclearize.[11]
It is noteworthy to know how the prisoner’s dilemma comes to be activated. In this paper it involves mistrust and fear that constitute dilemma. In prisoner’s dilemma, one party cannot trust on the stance of the other party in a period of time. From the second component of the famous Nuclear Revolution theory by Robert Jervis there is an implication of security risk among nuclear states. And, the risk is the threat that exploits vulnerability. What is the vulnerability that Jervis implies? His implication is that nuclear weapons dampen which drives distrust among states.[12] The distrust here is that whether a nuclear state strikes first on another nuclear state? Nuclearized states have sought to escape vulnerability by pursuing both missile defenses and nuclear superiority.[13] With the dilemma on the stance of the other party, a state thinks of if it is nuclear attack stricken whether it would possess the ability to hit back? By the USA’s use of Nuclear weapon on Japan, it became known that it was the finisher of World War II because Japan had no nuclear weapon. But, in the cold war era, the USSR had it. Jervis’ view is that as long as a state possesses a secure second-strike capability, its security is essentially guaranteed, even if it is unknown whether the adversary has a much larger arsenal.[14] In such a condition of dilemma between two nuclear states, both go for nuclear race. And, through a number of cold war issue such as Berlin Crisis, Korean War, and Cuban Missile Crisis, the distrust between the two superpowers solidified. A series of crises between the two superpowers with growing distrust tend to create more dilemmas in each which in turn leads to increased nuclear arms race. Here WGiwerc’s consideration is portrayed with his three value points in the prisoner’s dilemma. In the first value both players prefer to be the state with more weapons; and by the time the USSR tested her first bomb in 1949, the US had 250 bombs.[15] When the USSR acquired larger arsenal with Tsar Bomba in 1961 more powerful than 50 million TNT,[16] the US still went for nuclear buildup and by 1965, she had 31,000 nuclear weapons in her possession.[17] In the second value, the players are terrified of being the state with fewer weapons, and by 1965, the USSR acquired 6000 nuclear weapons, and by 1975, the US possessed 27,000 nuclear weapons.[18] In the third value, they would prefer both being less armed than both being more armed. Despite, signed the CTBT in 1963, the nuclear arms race did not stop until the end of cold war.[19] And, again, the NPT that was signed in 1968 by the two superpowers too, was unsuccessful too on nuclear disarmament.[20]
From a naive point of view, the best overall outcome should be for both powers to be disarmed, and saving their resources and thwarting the threat of warfare against each other.[21] But this position is not taken by any party due to the hegemonic and strategic contradiction between the US and the USSR. Looking back to the time of WWII in other way that if Fuchs would misinform Stalin about the US nuclear program, and if he would also have learned from the US leaders at Potsdam that the US has abandoned her nuclear move, he would fell in dilemma then. And, from his prisoner’s condition, in order to build a great communist empire[22] as his own vision, he would go for gaining nuclear power as one of his great tools on his way. Other option from his prison could be remaining inactive for a nuclear program. The chance could be if he would give up nuclear program his counterpart would acquire nuclear buildup, and for being inactive Soviet Union could fall significantly behind in the balance of power. Similarly, for the US, it could be the worst case scenario if Truman would halt his nuclear proliferation thinking that his counterpart would not be ambitious enough to be nuclearized. And, let’s say, could there be any chance that the US and the USSR would not run for nuclear capability? The answer is no. Their individual acquisitions and accumulations are meant to equal or exceed the power of the other party.[23]
The victorious nuclear weapons over Japan subsequently raised the vital need for the acquisition of nuclear weapons. And in order to win an international discord, one with more nuclear power is likely to be in an advantageous position in the case a war is ongoing, or if a war has not yet started. Prisoners’ dilemma works in the nuclear arms race because it is difficult to know what is really going on and how much is going on in the opponent’s ambitious nuclear projects due to employed counter intelligence. And being unable to know adequately on the quality and the quantity of nuclear buildup of the opponent, the race meant not to aim destroy the opponent utterly but to come to the point of a balance to be equally harmed or unharmed; to deter a war. Therefore, the arms race reinforced mutual caution.[24] Also, a race in strategically deployed nuclear arms can be explained by prisoner’s dilemma. Both superpowers strategically deployed the weapons to threaten each other’s land, client states or allied states, and interests. Jupiter missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads were installed in Turkey by the US in order to threat the USSR with the received fear that the Soviets was developing ICBM intending to strike the US strategic stations.[25] Similarly, with the fear that the USSR is under the Jupiter missile threat, following Castro’s request to save communism in Cuba, Khrushchev went for nuclear arms strategic installation in Cuba. For both superpowers fear worked. With the dilemma, both parties wanted to acquire strategic balance of power against each other; enhanced the nuclear arms race. Kennedy went for arming Eastern command with 1,456 aircraft and 355 missiles, and 80 Polaris missiles on nuclear submarines.[26] Kennedy also did not trust in Khrushchev’s letter that Cuban missiles had been deployed to defend Cuba.[27]Moreover, according to Plaus’ prisoner’s dilemma, the US and the USSR are always better off individually by arming, but if both superpowers arm, the collective outcome is lower in utility than if both countries disarm.[28] Therefore, JFK imperatively demanded immediate removal of the missiles. And in turn, Khrushchev demanded removal of Jupiter missiles from Turkey. However, again, at this point of disarmament, Plaus intended to add that in the case of prisoner’s dilemma, disarmament initiatives entail a great deal of risk because either side can always defect from the “solution”[29] i.e. the USA being an NPT has not ratified the CTBT.[30] Surely, Soviet nuclear strategic proliferation by means of Cuba was to have balance of power but Soviet intention was not to attack the USA because the price of invading a nuclear superpower would mean own annihilation.[31] On the other hand, Kennedy from his prison took it as a threat to the security of all Americans, and USSR’s nuclear striking capability against the Western hemisphere.[32] The consequence of the Cuban Missile Crisis was the escalation of the buildup of nuclear weapon that continued till the end of the Cold War.[33]
In conclusion it is needed to say that in the run of nuclear arms race during Cold War, none of the superpowers use nuclear weapon to their end. It was because both the US and the USSR gained first strike survival and second strike or strike back capability.[34] Acquiring second strike capability was in the box of prisoner’s dilemma in nuclear race to help the contenders for mutual deterrence, and retaining to not attack first and therefore, both the superpower’s ‘security is essentially guaranteed’[35] resulting the cold war never became hot; nuclear weapon remained unused.[36] After the collapse of the USSR, the cold war ended. The USA emerged as the sole world power. One of the major reasons for not using nuclear weapons during the conflict was that the acquisition of a nuclear arsenal by a player was intended to prevent the use of nuclear weapons by a nuclear adversary because the adversary’s nuclear use would inevitably bring its own destruction.
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[1] Priscilla McMillan, “STALIN AND THE BOMB, The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy”, 1939-1956. By David Holloway. Illustrated. 464 pp. New Haven: Yale University”, The New York Times [October, 1994], https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/books/98/12/06/specials/holloway-stalin.html?TB_iframe=true&height=5157&width=370.8 [accessed 9 June, 2022]
[2] History.com, “President Truman announces Soviets have exploded a nuclear device”, This Day in history, [September, 1949], https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/truman-announces-soviets-have-exploded-a-nuclear-device [accessed 12 June, 2022]
[3] Francis Gavin, “Beyond Deterrence: U.S. Nuclear Statecraft Since 1945”, 3, American Academy of Arts and Sciences. https://www.amacad.org/sites/default/files/academy/pdfs/Frank-Gavin-Beyond-Deterrence-US-Nuclear-Statecraft-Since-1945.pdf [accessed 12 June, 2022]
[4] Nuno Monteiro, and Alexandre Debs, “The Strategic Logic of Nuclear Proliferation”, International Security, Vol. 39, No. 2 (Fall 2014): 21, doi:10.1162/ISEC_a_00177
[5] Monteiro, “The Strategic”, 4
[6] Bernerd Brodie, and Arnold Wolfers, eds. “The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order”, Yale Institute of International Studies, [Connecticut]: 63, https://www.osti.gov/opennet/servlets/purl/16380564 [accessed June 11, 2022]
[7] James MacSmith, “6 times the world was on the edge of nuclear war”, New York Post, April 18, 2017, https://nypost.com/2017/04/18/6-times-the-world-was-on-the-edge-of-nuclear-war/ [accessed June 15, 2022]
[8] Ibid.
[9] Gavin, “Beyond Deterrence”, 21.
[10] DailyHistory.ord, “What were Joseph Stalin’s goals as World War Two ended”, para. 19, https://dailyhistory.org/What_were_Joseph_Stalin’s_goals_as_World_War_Two_ended
[11] Monteiro, “The Strategic”, 9
[12] Thomas Mahnken, “Introduction: The Gap Between Theory And Practice” Book Review Roundtable: The Revolution that Failed, Texas National Security Review, June 14, 2021, para. 5, https://tnsr.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/TNSR-Green-Book-Review-Roundtable-PDF-1.pdf
[13] Jayita Sarkar, “Who and What Made the Revolution that Failed?” Book Review, Para. 10
[14] Thomas Mahnken, “Who and What Made the Revolution that Failed?” Book Review, Para. 5
[15] Ekaterina Blinova, “From 1945-49 the US and UK planned to bomb Russia into the Stone Age: Was the US Cold War military doctrine really ‘defensive’ and who actually started the nuclear arms race?”, Canadian Dimension, October 9, 2016, para. 15, https://canadiandimension.com/articles/view/from-1945-49-the-us-and-uk-planned-to-bomb-russia-into-the-stone-age [accessed June 17, 2022]
[16] Brandon Specktor, “Russia declassifies footage of ‘Tsar Bomba’ — the most powerful nuclear bomb in history”, Live Science, August 31, 2020, https://www.livescience.com/tsar-bomba-secret-test-footage-declassified.html [accessed 07 June, 2022]
[17] United Nations, “International Day against Nuclear Tests 29 August”, History, https://www.un.org/en/observances/end-nuclear-tests-day/history [accessed 1June 17, 2022]
[18] Ibid.
[19] Jatin Verma’s IAS Academy, “Failure of CTBT & a new nuclear arms race”, International Relations, April 27, 2020, https://www.jatinverma.org/failure-of-ctbt-a-new-nuclear-arms-race [accessed June 17, 2022]
[20] Marianne Hanson, “The failed effort to ban the ultimate weapon of mass destruction”, The Conversation, June 8, 2015, https://theconversation.com/the-failed-effort-to-ban-the-ultimate-weapon-of-mass-destruction-42722 [accessed 17 June, 2022]
[21] Cornnel University, “United States vs. Soviet Union: Prisoner’s Dilemma”, Networks, para. 2, https://blogs.cornell.edu/info2040/2015/09/11/united-states-vs-soviet-union-prisoners-dilemma/
[22] DailyHistory.org. “What were Joseph”, para. 21
[23] Encyclopedia.com, “Arms Control and Arms Race”, Social sciences, Applied and social sciences magazinespara, para. 14, https://www.encyclopedia.com/social-sciences/applied-and-social-sciences-magazines/arms-control-and-arms-race
[24] Ibid., para. 17
[25] Jennifer Schaffer, “The Turkish Missile Crisis: The Root of Anti-American Sentiment in Turkey”, Turkish Heritage Organization, May 31, 2020, para. 3, https://medium.com/meddah-a-u-s-turkey-storytelling-project/the-turkish-missile-crisis-the-root-of-anti-american-sentiment-in-turkey-6e7258e8975
[26] Ray Locker, “US. planned a 261,000-troop invasion force of Cuba, newly released documents show”, Politics, USA TODAY, October 30, 2017, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2017/10/30/u-s-planned-261-000-troop-invasion-force-cuba-newly-released-documents-show/813376001/ [accessed 12 June, 2022]
[27] John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, “Letter From Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy”, October 27, 1962. Para. 13, https://microsites.jfklibrary.org/cmc/oct27/doc4.html [accessed June 16, 2022]
[28] S. Plous, “Perceptual Illusions and Military Realities: Results From a Computer Generated Perceptual Dilemma”, Department of Psychology, Stanford University, 6, https://www.socialpsychology.org/pdf/jcr1987.pdf [accessed 12 June, 2022]
[29] Ibid., 9
[30] Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)” https://www.nti.org/education-center/treaties-and-regimes/comprehensive-nuclear-test-ban-treaty-ctbt/ [accessed 17 June, 2022]
[31] Robert Jervis, “The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon” (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989). https://cpb-us-w2.wpmucdn.com/wp.towson.edu/dist/b/55/files/2019/11/Fall-1991-Book-Review.pdf [accessed June 9, 2022]
[32] Vincent Ferraro, “President John F. Kennedy’s Speech Announcing the Quarantine against Cuba, October 22, 1962”, The Ruth C. Lawson Professor of International Politics, [Washington: 22 October 1962], para 01 and 05, https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/kencuba.htm [Accessed June 07, 2022]
[33] History on the Net, “Result of the Cuban Missile Crisis”, para. 2, https://www.historyonthenet.com/result-of-the-cuban-missile-crisis-2 [accessed June 07, 2022]
[34] Kenneth Waltz, “Nuclear Myths and Political Realities”, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 84, No. 3 (American Political Science Association, Sep., 1990): pp. 731-745, https://doi.org/10.2307/1962764
[35] Mahnken, “Introduction”, para. 5
[36] Ibid., para. 2
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